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In this paper we extend the location problem of spatial competition given by
$\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{e}]1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}[2]$ to include the discriminatory pricing. We characterize various types of
asymmetric equilibrium , in which the two players choose different location strate-
gies.
1 Introduction
The first important contribution to the study of Location Problem of Spatial Compe.
tition was made by $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}[2]$. He studied duopolistic competition in a liner market and
claimed existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices. However his model was re-examined
by d’Aspremont,Gabszewicz &Thisse[3]. They point to a flaw in the original paper of
Hotelling because a pure strategy equilibrium in prices(given the ’location’) does not
always exist. Recently, Helmut $\mathrm{B}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}[1]$ show that Hotelling’s model with quadratic con-sumer transportation cost possesses an infinity of equilibrium in which the duopolists
randomize over locations.In our paper we consider a duopoly in which each firm selectsa location simultaneously and then chooses to price discriminatory in a linear market
where consumers are uniforrffiy distributed. We can think of this model as a $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{w}+\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}$
non-cooperative game between the two firms. We present a price equilibrium and charac-
terize the location equilibrium. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the model precisely, in section 3 we discuss our results on the location equilibrium.
2 The model
What is discriminatory price ? Discriminatory Price is a price which a firm can
quote each customer a different mill price. In our paper, we assume that the firms set
discriminatory price. The model is described as follows.
Let two firms, denoted A and $\mathrm{B}$ , be located on line segment $[0,1]$ . The locations of the
firms are denoted $x$ and $y(0\leq x\leq 1,0\leq y\leq 1)$ respectively. They sell the homogeneous
product with zero cost(the identical production cost can be normalized to $\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}$) $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ the
customers are assumed to be uniformly distributed over the segment Each customer
purchases one unit of the product. Since the product is homogeneous, a customer will
buy from the firm for which full $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{e}$(mill price plus transportation cost) is lowest. It is
supposed that the transport is under the customer’s control, and the transportation cost
are assumed to be linear in distance with coefficients $t$ . We denote the transportation cost
function by $C(d)$ ( $d$ is a Euclidean distance from customer’s location to firm’s location),
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i.e. $C(d)=td,$ $C(\mathrm{O})=0$ . If the full prices are the same, the customer buys from
the firm located closer to him, and if both prices and distances are equal , he selects
the firm to buy randomly with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ . We can think this model as a two-stage
non-cooperative game. In the first stage, two firms select location $(x, y)$ simultaneously,
and then having observed the locations selected, choose discriminatory price $(p_{A},p_{B})$
simultaneously. The customers choose according to the criterion above, and the firms
receive their profits. We assume $p_{A}\in[0, \infty)$ , $p_{B}\in[0, \infty)$ .
the ,
then
$C_{A}=$ {$z\in[0,1]:pA(z)+t|z-x|\leq p_{B}(Z)+t|z-y|$ and $|z-x|\leq|z-y|$ };
$C_{B}=$ {$z\in[0,1]:pB(z)+t|z-y|\leq p_{A}(z)+t|z-x|$ and $|z-y|\leq|z-x|$ }.
The $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}$ function
$\sim.$ .s are:
$\pi_{A}(p_{A},p_{B}, x, y)=\int_{C_{A}}pA(Z)f(z)dz$ , $\pi_{B}(p_{A},p_{B}, x, y)=\int_{C_{B}}p_{B}(Z)f(z)dz$ . (2.1)
where $f(z)=1,$ $z\in[0,1]$ .
At the first, for any given location $(x, y)$ , we present the price equilibrium pair
$(p_{A}^{*}(z),p^{*}B(z))$ for the location $\mathrm{z}’ \mathrm{s}$ customer, to capture the location $\mathrm{z}’ \mathrm{s}$ customer, firm A
has to charge a price $p_{A}(z)$ satisfying
$p_{A}(_{Z})+t|z-x|\leq pB(_{Z)|y|}+tz-,ifX\leq y$ .
i.e. $p_{A}(z)\leq p_{B}(z)+t|z-y|-t|Z-x|$ . However, to capture the same customer, firm $\mathrm{B}$
will cutdown his price
$p_{B}(z)arrow 0$ , $p_{A}(z)\leq t|z-y|-t|z-x|$ .
Hence, $p_{A}^{*}(Z)-- \max\{t|z-y|-t|z-X|, \mathrm{O}\}.\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{e}$ .
$p_{A}^{*}(z)=\{$
$t(y-X)$ , if $0\leq z\leq x$
$t(y+x-2z)$ , if $X \leq Z\leq\frac{x+y}{2}$ ;
$0$ , $\mathit{0}.w$
(2.2)
similarly, $p_{B}^{*}(z)= \max\{t|z-x|-t|Z-y|, 0\}$ . i.e.
$p_{B}^{*}(z)=\{$
$t(y-X)$ , $ify<z\leq 1$




If $x\geq y$ , by symmetry we g.et the price equilibrium:
$p_{A}^{*}(z)=$
’
$t(x-y)$ , $ifx<z\leq 1$






$t(x-y)$ , if $0\leq z\leq y$
$t(y+x-2z),$ if..y $\leq Z\leq\frac{x+y}{2}$ .
$0$ , $\mathit{0}.w$
$(p_{A}^{*},p_{B})*$ is a pair of Nash equilibrium. i.e
(2.5)
$\{\pi_{B}(p_{A}^{A},p_{B}^{*\}_{\geq\pi_{B}(^{pA},x},\}},X,y\pi_{A}(p,p_{B},x,y***\geq\pi_{A(,px,y}p_{A}*p_{B},y*B", f\sigma r\forall p_{A}\in[f_{or\forall}p_{B}\in \mathrm{t}0\infty \mathrm{o},,\infty)_{)},\cdot$ .
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\cdot$. Without loss of generality, we only show:
$\pi_{A}(p_{A}^{*},p_{B}^{*}, X, y)\geq\pi_{A(pA,px,y)}*B$
”
$f\sigma r\forall p_{A}\in[0, \infty),ifx\leq y$ .
Let
$C_{A}^{*}$ $=$ $\{z\in[0,1]:pA(*z)+t|z-X|\leq p_{B}^{*}(z)+t|z-y|and|Z-X|\leq|z-y|\}$ ;
$C_{A}’$ $=$ $\{z\in[0,1]:pA(z)+t|z-x|\leq p_{B}^{*}(z)+t|z-y|and|Z-X|\leq|z-y|\}$ .
Obviously, $C_{A}^{*}=C_{A}’$ .






$=$ $\pi_{A}(p_{A}^{*},p_{B}^{*}, x, y)$ . Q.E.D.
The payoffs under prices equilibrium for firms are:
$\pi_{A}(p_{A’ p_{B}}^{*}*, x, y)=\frac{1}{4}t(y-x)(y+3x)$ , $ifx\leq y$ , (2.6)
$\pi_{A}(p_{A}^{*},p_{B}^{*}, x, y)=\frac{1}{4}t(x-y)(4-y-3X),$ $ifx\geq y$ (2.7)
for firm $\mathrm{A}$ , and
$\pi_{B}(p_{A}^{*},p_{B}^{*}, x,y)=\frac{1}{4}t(x-y)(X+3y)$ , $ifx\geq y$ , (2.8)
$\pi_{B}(p_{A}^{*},p_{B}^{*}, x, y)=\frac{1}{4}t(y-X)(4-X-3y),$ $if_{X}\leq y$ (2.9)
for firm B.
Define
$\pi_{A}(x,y)\equiv\pi_{A}(p_{A}^{*}, p_{B}^{*}, x, y),$ . (2.10)
$\pi_{B}(x,y)\equiv\pi_{B}(p_{A}^{*},p_{B}, Xy)*,$ . (2.11)
Notice that payoffs are symmetric in the sense that
$\pi_{A}(x, y)=\pi_{B}(1-x, 1-y)$ , (2.12)
$\pi_{A}(x, 1-X)=\pi_{B}(x, 1-x)$ . (2.13)
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3Characterizations of the location equilibrium
In this section we investigate the location equilibrium of firms under price equilibrium.
Proposition 2 : In the above game two pure strategy location equilibria $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}arrow$ . They
are $(x^{*}.’ y^{*})=( \frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}(xy)*,*=(\frac{3}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$ .










Therefore there is exactly one equilibrium such that $x^{*}\leq y^{*}$ , namely $(x^{*}, y^{*})=( \frac{1}{4}, \frac{3}{4})$ .
By symmetry of payoffs, there is exactly one equilibrium such that $x^{*}\geq y^{*}$ , namely
$(x^{*},y^{*})=( \frac{3}{4}, \frac{1}{4})$ . Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 : In the above game there is a mixed equilibrium strategy in which firm
$\mathrm{B}$ chooses $y^{*}= \frac{1}{6}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and $y^{*}= \frac{5}{6}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and firm A chooses
$x^{*}= \frac{1}{2}$ with probability 1. Symmetrically there is an equilibrium in which firm A chooses
$x^{*}= \frac{1}{6}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and $x^{*}= \frac{5}{6}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ and firm $\mathrm{B}$ chooses $y^{*}= \frac{1}{2}$ with
probability 1. ..
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\cdot$. To prove the first part, we first show that , given the behaviors of firm $\mathrm{B}$ ,
firm A cannot gain by deviating from $x^{*}-- \frac{1}{2}$ Indeed, firm A’s payoff function is
$\phi(x)\equiv\frac{1}{2}\pi_{A}(x, \frac{1}{6})+\frac{1}{2}\pi_{A}(x, \frac{5}{6})$ . (3.3)
We will prove $x^{*}= \frac{1}{2}$ is a global maximizer for $\phi(x)$ subject to $x\in[0,1]$ .
Case 1: $x \in[0, \frac{1}{6}]$






$\phi’’(_{X)}-- -\frac{3}{2}t<0, \phi(\frac{1}{6})=\frac{1}{9}t$ .
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Case 2: $x \in[\frac{1}{6}, \frac{5}{6}]$




. $\cdot$ $\phi’(x)$ $=$ $\frac{1}{4}t(3-6X)\Rightarrow x=\frac{1}{2}$ . .. $\cdot$ . ’..
$\phi’’(x)..=$ $- \frac{3}{2}t<0,$ $\phi(\frac{1}{2})=\frac{7}{36}t$ .
$\cdot$ .
Case 3: $x \in[\frac{5}{6},1]$
$\phi(x)$ $\equiv$ $\frac{1}{2}\pi_{A}(_{X}, \frac{1}{6})+\frac{1}{2}\pi A(X, \frac{5}{6})$
$=$ $\frac{1}{8}t(x-\frac{1}{6})(4-\frac{1}{6}-3X)+\frac{1}{8}t(X-\frac{5}{6})(4-\frac{5}{6}-3x)$
$=$ $\frac{1}{4}t(-\frac{59}{36}+5x-3X^{2})$ . -G
$\phi’(x)$ $=$ $\frac{1}{4}t(5-6X)\Rightarrow x=\frac{5}{6}$ .
$\phi’’(x)$ $=$ $- \frac{3}{2}t<0,$ $\phi(\frac{5}{6})=\frac{1}{9}t$ .
So $x^{*}= \frac{1}{2}$ is an optimal response of firm A to firm $\mathrm{B}’ \mathrm{s}$ strategy.
Conversely, against firm A’s strategy , firm $\mathrm{B}$ will select $y^{*}= \frac{1}{6}$ or $y^{*}= \frac{5}{6}$ In fact
, firm A’s payoff function is
$\psi(y)\equiv\pi_{B}(\frac{1}{2}, y)$ . (3.4)
Case 1: $y \in[0, \frac{1}{2}]$
..







$\psi’(y)$ $=$ $\frac{1}{4}t(\mathrm{I}-6y)\Rightarrow y=\frac{1}{6}$ .
$\psi’’.(y)$ $— \frac{3}{2}t<0,$ $\psi(\frac{1}{6})=\frac{1}{12}t$ .
..





$\psi’(y)$ $– \frac{1}{4}t(5-6y)\Rightarrow y=\frac{5}{6}$ .
$\psi’’(y)$ $=$ $- \frac{3}{2}t<0,\psi(\frac{5}{6})=\frac{1}{12}t$ .
As $\psi(\frac{1}{6})=\psi(\frac{5}{6})$ , this implies that both $y^{*}= \frac{1}{6}$ and $y^{*}= \frac{5}{6}$ maximize firm $\mathrm{B}’ \mathrm{s}$ payoff.
This proves that randomizing over $y^{*}= \frac{1}{6}$ and $y^{*}= \frac{5}{6}$ is an optimal response of firm $\mathrm{B}$ to
firm A’s strategy.
The second part of the proposition follows by symmetry. $\mathrm{Q}.\mathrm{E}$.D.
Proposition 4 : In the above game there is a pair of location vectors $(\xi,v)=$
$((x_{1,\ldots,n}x), (y_{1}, \ldots, y_{n-1}))$ and a pair of probability vectors $(\alpha,\beta)=((\alpha_{1}, \ldots, \alpha_{n}), (\beta_{1}, \ldots, \beta_{n-1}))$
such that firm A choosing $x_{i}$ with probability $\alpha_{i}>0$ and firm $\mathrm{B}$ choosing $y_{i}$ with prob-
ability $\beta_{i}$ is an equilibrium for any number $n\geq 2$ . Moreover, $x_{i}<y_{i}<x_{i+1}$ for all
$i=1,$ $\ldots,n-1$ .
Proof: Define $z\in \mathrm{R}^{2n-1}$ by $Z\equiv$ { $\xi,v|0\leq x_{i}\leq y_{i}\leq x_{i+1}..\leq 1$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n-1$}.





Note that $\frac{\partial^{2}\pi_{A}(_{X},y)}{\partial^{2}x}=-\frac{3}{2}t<0$ for $x>y$ and $x<y$ . Therefore $\varphi_{A}(\bullet, v, \beta)$ is a strictly
concave function of $x$ for all $x\in(y_{i-}1,y_{i})$ , where $y_{0}\equiv 0$ and $y_{n}\equiv 1$ . This , together
with the maximum theorem , implies that
$f_{Ai}(v, \beta)\equiv arg\max_{\overline{x}\in[y\dot{.}-1,y_{i}}]\varphi A(x,v,\beta)$ (3.7)
is a continuous function of $(v, \beta)$ . Similarly,
$f_{Bi}( \xi, \alpha)\equiv arg\max_{y\in[]}x_{i},xi+1\varphi B(y,\xi, \alpha)$ (3.8)
is a continuous function of $(\xi, \alpha)$ .
Define $f_{A}(\bullet)\equiv[f_{A1}(\bullet), \ldots, fAn(\bullet)]$ and $f_{B}(\bullet)\equiv[fB1(\bullet), \ldots, fBn-1(\bullet)]$ .
Define $S_{A}\equiv\{\alpha\in R^{n}|\Sigma_{i}\alpha_{i}=1\}$ and $S_{B}\equiv\{\beta\in R^{n-1}|\Sigma i\beta_{i}=1\}$ . Then
$g_{A}( \xi,v,\beta)\equiv arg\min_{\alpha\in s_{A}}\sum_{i}\alpha_{i}\sum\pi A(Xj’)iy_{j}\beta j$
, (3.9)
$g_{B}( \xi,v, \alpha)\equiv arg\min_{\beta\in}s_{B}\sum\beta ii\sum_{j}.\pi_{B}(x_{j,y}.i)\alpha_{j}$ (3.10)
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$\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{n}h(\xi,v\mathrm{v}\ominus \mathrm{X}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a},1\alpha \mathrm{u},\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\beta)’\equiv f_{A}(\mathrm{u}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{O}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}_{B}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{S}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}, \mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}_{A}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\Gamma \mathrm{r}\mathrm{p}_{0}\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{O}}- v,\beta)_{\mathrm{X}}f_{B}(\xi,\alpha)\mathrm{x}gA(\xi,v,\beta)\cross g(\dot{\xi},v,\alpha \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{s}Z\cross S\cross s^{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{S}}B\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$
itself. Also, it is convex valued and upperhemicontinuous so that by Kakutani’s theorem
it has a fixed point $(\xi^{*}, v^{*}, \alpha\beta^{*}*,)$ . We will prove that..the point $(\xi^{*},v^{**}, \alpha,\beta^{*}-.)$ satisfiesthe conditions of Proposition 4.
First we show that $\varphi_{A}(x_{i}^{*}, v^{*}, \beta^{*})=\varphi_{A}(x_{i+1}^{*},v\beta^{*}*,)$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n-1$ . Suppose
$\varphi_{A}(x_{i}^{*}, v^{*},\beta*)\neq\varphi_{A}(X_{i+1}^{*}, v\beta^{*}*,)$ Note that by definition of $g_{A}(\bullet)$ one has $\alpha_{i}^{*}=0$ for
all $i$ such that $\varphi_{A}(x_{i}^{*},v^{*},\beta^{*})>\min_{j\varphi_{A}}(X_{j}*,*v, \beta^{*})$ . Suppose there is a $k>1$ such that
$\varphi_{A}(X_{i}v*,*,\beta^{*})>\min_{j\varphi_{A}}(x_{j},v**,\beta^{*})$ for all $i<k$ and $\varphi_{A}(x_{k},v**,\beta^{*})=\min_{j\varphi_{A}}(x_{j},v**,\beta^{*})$
Then $\varphi_{B}(y,\xi^{**}, \alpha)$ is strictly decreasing over $[x_{1}, x_{k}**]$ because $\alpha_{i}^{*}=0$ for all $i<k$ . Ac-
cordingly, by definition of $f_{Bi}$ ( $\bullet$) one has $y_{i}^{*}=x_{i}^{*}$ for all $i<k$ . Therefore, by definition
of $f_{Ak}(\bullet)$ , $x_{k}^{*}$ must maximize $\varphi_{A}(x,v^{*}, \beta^{*})$ subject to $x_{k-1}^{*}\leq x\leq y_{k}^{*}$ . As $\varphi_{A}(x,v^{*},.\beta^{*})$ is
strictly concave over $[x_{k-1}^{*}, y_{k}^{*}]$ this yields a contradiction $\varphi_{A}(X_{k-1}*, v\beta^{*}*,)>\varphi_{A}(x_{k}^{*}, v^{*}, \beta*)$
The same argument shows that ther.$\mathrm{e}$ cannot be a $k<n$ such that $\varphi_{A}(x_{i}v^{*}*,, \beta^{*})>$
$\min_{j}\varphi_{A}(x_{j},v**,\beta^{*})$ for all $i<k$ . ... .
Suppose there is a $k$ and an $l$ such that $k<l-1$ and $\varphi_{A}(x_{i}^{*}, v^{*}, \beta*)>\min_{j\varphi_{A}}(x_{j}, v**,\beta^{*})$
for all $k<i<l$ , and $\varphi_{A}(x_{k}^{*},v^{*},\beta*)=\varphi_{A}(X^{*},v^{*}l’\beta^{*})=\min_{j}\varphi_{A}(x_{j},v**,\beta^{*})$ Then
$\varphi_{B}(y, \xi*, \alpha^{*})$ is strictly concave over $[x_{k}^{**}, x_{l}]$ and so one has $y_{k}^{*}=x_{k+1}^{*}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}y_{l-1}*=x_{l-1}^{*}$
. In the first case, $x_{k}^{*}$ must maximize $\varphi_{A}(x, v^{*}, \beta^{*})$ subject to $y_{k-1}^{*}\leq x\leq x_{k+1}^{*}$ . But then
$\varphi_{A}(x_{k+1}^{*},v\beta^{*}*,)>\varphi_{A}(x_{k},v**, \beta^{*})$ leads to a contradiction because $\varphi_{A}(\bullet,v\beta^{*}*,)$ is strictly
concave over $[y_{k-1}^{*}, X_{k1}]*+\cdot$ In the second case, a similar argument yields a contradiction.
This proves $\varphi_{A}(X_{i}^{*}, v\beta^{*}*,)=\varphi_{A}(x_{i+}^{*}1’ v\beta^{*}*,)$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n-1$ . The same argument
as above can be used to show that $\varphi_{B}(y_{i}^{*}, \xi*, \alpha*)=\varphi_{B}(y_{i+1}^{*}, \xi^{*}, \alpha^{*})$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n-1$ .
Next we will show that $x_{i}^{*}<y_{i}^{*}<x_{i+1}^{*}$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n-1$ . Clearly, one cannot
have $x_{1}^{*}=x_{n}^{*}$ because , otherwise, decreasing $x_{1}$ or increasing $x_{n}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{d}$ increase firm A’s
payoff $\varphi_{A}(x, v^{*}, \beta^{*})$ . Suppose there is a $k$ such that $x_{k}^{*}=y_{k}^{*}<x_{k+1}^{*}$ . Then $x_{k+1}^{*}$ must
maximize $\varphi_{A}(x, v^{*}, \beta^{*})$ subject to $x_{k}^{*}\leq x\leq y_{k+1}^{*}$ . As $\varphi_{A}(x, v\beta^{*}*,)$ is strictly concave
over $[x_{k}^{*}, y_{k+1}^{*}]$ this leads to a contradiction to $\varphi_{A}(x_{k}^{*}, v^{*}, \beta*)=\varphi_{A}(X_{k+1}^{*}, v\beta^{*}*,)$ . By the
same argument one can rule out that $x_{k}^{*}<y_{k}^{*}=x_{k+1}^{*}$ for some $k$ . Finally, $y_{k-1}^{*}=$
$x_{k}^{*}<y_{k}^{*}$ or $y_{k}^{*}<x_{k+1}^{*}=y_{k+1}^{*}$ would contradict that $y_{k}^{*}$ must maximize $\varphi_{B}(y,\xi*, \alpha^{*})$
subject to $x_{k}^{*}\leq y\leq x_{k+1}^{*}$ because $\varphi_{B}(y,\xi^{**}, \alpha)$ is strictly concave over $[x_{k}^{*}, x_{k1}^{*}]+$ and
$\varphi_{B}(y_{i}^{*},\xi^{**}, \alpha)=\varphi_{B}(y_{i1}^{*}+’\xi^{*}, \alpha^{*})$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,n-1$ .
Last we will show that $\alpha_{i}^{*}>0$ and $\beta_{i}^{*}>0$ for all $i$ . Suppose $\alpha_{i}^{*}=0$ . Then
$\varphi_{B}(y, \xi*, \alpha^{*})$ is strictly decreasing over $[x_{1}, x_{2}**]$ and so $y_{1}^{*}=x_{1}^{*}$ ] , this leads to a contradic-
tion to our above result that $x_{i}^{*}<y_{i}^{*}$ ] for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,$ $n-1$ . Similarly, $\alpha_{i}^{*}=0$ is impos-
sible. Suppose there is a $k$ and an $l$ such that $k<l-1$ and $\alpha_{k}^{*}>0$ , $\alpha_{l}^{*}>0$ , and $\alpha_{i}^{*}=0$
for all $k<i<l$ . Then $\varphi_{B}(y, \xi^{**}, \alpha)$ is strictly concave over $[x_{k}^{**}, x_{l}]$ and so $y_{k}^{*}=x_{k+1}^{*}$
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}/\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}y_{l_{-1}}^{*}=x_{l-1}^{*}$ . This again contradicts our above result. The same argument proves
that $\beta_{i}^{*}>0$ for all $i=1,$ $\ldots,n-1$ . Q.E.D.
By symmetry of payoffs we can show that there also is an equilibrium in which firm
A randomizes over $n-1$ and firm $\mathrm{B}$ over $n$ locations. Moreover, the same arguments as
in the proof Proposition 4 can be used to prove the next Proposition which both firms
randomly select one of $n$ locations.
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Proposition 5 : In the above game there is a pair of location vectors $(\xi,v)=$
$((x_{1,\ldots,n}x), (y_{1}, \ldots,y_{n}))$ and a pair of probability vectors $(\alpha, \beta)=((\alpha_{1}, \ldots, \alpha_{n}), (\beta_{1}, \ldots, \beta_{n}))$
such that ffim A choosing $x_{i}$ with probability $\alpha_{i}>0$ and firm $\mathrm{B}$ choosing $y_{i}$ with prob-
ability $\beta_{i}$ is an equilibrium for any number $n\geq 2$ . Moreover, $x_{i}<y_{i}<x_{i+1}<y_{i+1}$ for
all $i=1,$ $\ldots,n-1$ .
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